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Does the Existence of Market Power Affect Marketing Loan Programs? 





The paper analyzes the effects that a demand with oligopsonistic power may have on the 
operation of a marketing loan program (especially on the program cost). We measure 
these effects using a model for the US peanut market where evidence indicates that the 
demand is highly concentrated. Our results show that the USDA strategy of keeping a 
repayment rate above the market-clearing price set by the demand is not a sustainable 
strategy, since the demand can follow a hand-to-mouth strategy, postponing its purchases 
of peanuts, letting USDA accumulate stocks and forcing it to reduce the price. 
 




  Marketing loan programs are an important element of the US agricultural policy. 
Although commodity loans have operated in the US since the 1930s, the marketing loan 
programs and deficiency payments in their current form were introduced by the 1985 
Farm Act. While initially applied to rice and upland cotton, the marketing loan programs 
were extended by the 1990 Farm Act to soybeans, other oilseeds (sunflower, canola, 
rapeseed, safflower, mustard seed, and flaxseed), wheat and feed grains (corn, sorghum, 
barley, oats). The 1996 Farm Act continued these programs and recently, under the Farm 
Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (2002 Farm Act, hereafter), it has been 
extended to peanuts, graded and non-graded wool, mohair, honey, small chickpeas, 
lentils, and dry peas (Westcott and Price, 1999, USDA-ERS, 2002). 
                                                 
1  Paper prepared for the 2003 AAEA Annual Meeting, Montreal, Quebec, July 27-
30. The authors are Post-Doctoral Research Associate, and Professor, respectively. 
National Center for Peanut Competitiveness, Department of Agricultural and Applied 
Economics, College of Agricultural and Environment Sciences, Griffin Campus, 
University of Georgia, Griffin, GA 30223-1797. Corresponding e-mail: 
revoredo@griffin.uga.edu. We would like to thank Dr. John Allison for his help and 
valuable discussions.   3
Three prices are important in the operation of a marketing loan program: the 
marketing loan rate, the loan repayment rate, and the market price.  A producer that 
receives a marketing loan can repay it by paying the lesser of the marketing loan rate plus 
interests, or the repayment rate set by USDA, designed to minimize loan forfeiture, 
government-owned stocks, and storage costs.  
The importance of the market structure for the marketing loan program comes 
through its role in the market price determination. It is interesting to note that, although 
the demand for several farm products tends to be concentrated with few purchasers,
2 the 
effects of marketing loans have been normally analyzed in the context of perfect 
competition (see, for instance Westcott and Price, 2001). Under perfect competition, the 
market price can be above or below the loan rate, depending on the specific supply and 
demand conditions. However, under market power, specifically oligopsony, one would 
tend to observe market prices under the loan rate, implying a permanent support for the 
farmers.  
  The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it analyzes the effect that imperfect 
competition, specifically a situation where the demand possesses oligopsonistic power, 
may have on the operation of a marketing loan program. Second, it illustrates the effects 
of the imperfect competition in the case of the peanut market where, according to the 
existing literature, the demand (i.e., shellers/processors) is highly concentrated.   
  We start the paper with a model for an industry where the purchasers of the 
agricultural raw material have market power and where a marketing loan program is in 
                                                 
2  See Rogers and Sexton (1994) for an assessment of the importance of oligopsony in 
agriculture.    4
operation. Although the model refers to the peanut market, it can be applied to any other 
industry. The next section introduces the peanut market as an illustrative example. We 
present the available evidence on demand concentration in this market and also the 
changes in policy from the 2002 Farm Act. Then, we estimate and calibrate the 
relationships required for the model and perform some simulations to assess the effect of 
market power. Finally, we present some conclusions. 
 
II.  Marketing Loan Program in the Presence of Market Power 
In its basic version (see Westcott and Price, 1999) when the marketing loan rate is 
above the market price, the marketing loan program ensures a minimum per-unit revenue 
to farmers. The loan rate, however, is not a "floor price" since the purchases of the 
commodity are made at a price equal to the repayment rate, which normally reflects 
market prices. The wedge between demand and supply prices is the level of support per 
unit offered by the government. It is important to note that the market price can be above 
the marketing loan rate (as shown by Westcott and Price, 1999 for several commodities) 
in which case the marketing loan program only offers a source of short term liquidity to 
farmers. 
If the demand is concentrated with only few purchasers, the market price does not 
reflect competitive conditions. On the contrary, it will tend to be below the loan rate, 
implying constant support to producers. Furthermore, a concentrated demand may offer a 
low price for the commodity, and if the repayment rate is set based on this non-
competitive market price, the situation would imply a larger cost of the program for the 
government compared to what would be expected under a perfect competition situation.   5
  Let us consider two vertically related markets of the peanut industry: the shelled 
peanut market and farmer stock peanut  market  peanut. While the market for shelled 
peanuts appears competitive (or in any case, double oligopolistic), the market for farmer 
stock peanuts can be characterized as oligopsonistic.  
  We will represent the supply of peanuts as lagged one year. The planned supply 
equation is a stable function (i.e.,  ( ) • H ) that depends on the expected price paid for the 
peanuts (i.e.,  [] W
t 1 t P E − ).
3 In the presence of a marketing loan program, the price 
received by the farmer cannot be lower than the loan price, (i.e., L P ). The planned supply 
function is given by (1): 
[ ] ( ) L W
t 1 t t P , P E H H ˆ ) 1 ( − =
 
  The production of shelled peanuts, as shown in equation (2) is characterized by a 
quasi-fixed proportion production function. This function has been extensively applied to 
agricultural processing firm (see for instance, Heien, 1980, for the food industry, Brorsen, 
Chavas, Grant, and Schnake, 1985, for the flour industry; and Durham and Sexton, 1992, 
for California’s processing tomato market). In (2) the variable  t L  is a composite good 
that represents all other factors of production different than peanuts (i.e.,  t M) .  T h e  
function  () • φ  relates the composite good with the output, and it is strictly concave (i.e.,  
() 0
t L > ∂




• φ ∂ ). 
                                                 
3 Strictly speaking in the case of multiplicative disturbances, the supply depends on the 
expected marginal revenue, which is different than the expected price, which is the case 
when the disturbances are additive, see Wright 1979. To simplify the text we call it 














min Q ) 2 ( 
  From (2), the quantity of peanuts demanded by shellers will be  t Q λ , where λ is 
a technical coefficient that gives the requirement of peanuts to produce  t Q units of the 
processed good.  
  The availability of peanuts (i.e.,  ) At is given by the realized supply (i.e., 
() t t H ˆ e 1+ , where  t e is a multiplicative random shock) and by the amount of commodity 
carried by the USDA under the marketing loan program (i.e.,  1 t G − ).
4 We will assume 
that the US market will remain protected by a tariff rate quota that limits peanut imports 
to a minimum access (see Skully, 1999). USDA's stocks represent an excess of supply, 
which is the amount forfeited and becomes USDA stock under the marketing loan 
program (i.e., t G ). Equation (3) represents this relationship. 
() ( ) t t 1 t t Q H ˆ e 1 G G 3 λ − + + = −  
  Equation (3) indicates that, unless the demand for peanuts is flexible to adjust to 
supply shocks, which is the only randomness that we are going to consider in the paper, 
the peanut market will be in disequilibrium and USDA stocks will absorb it.  
  The situation when the demand is not flexible poses a problem to the price 
determination when the demand possesses market power (i.e., monopsony/oligopsony), 
                                                 
4 We will assume that shellers will not carry speculative inventories of the commodity 
because of the market power assumption given later in the paper. Under market power 
they can let USDA to handle the inventories and afford the storage cost and just purchase 
them later at the repayment rate. Therefore, the only inventories that they may carry are 
pipeline inventories that we are not modeling in this paper.    7
because of the lagged response of the supply.  In the typical monopsony/oligopsony 
models, purchasers face the current supply (spot), and they can manipulate, through the 
quantity purchased, the price and also the quantity offered. In the case of an annual 
commodity, the supply at the time of the purchasing decision is perfectly inelastic, 
therefore the static monopsony/oligopsony model would predict a price equal to zero. In 
addition, the monopsony/oligopsony models do not consider the presence of inventories.  
  In the case of disequilibrium we need to include the way that prices are going to 
adjust to the excess of supply. We propose that they adjust according to equation (4): 




t Q G H ˆ e 1 P P ) 4 ( λ − + + ⋅ γ − = − −  
where  0 > γ  is an adjustment parameter that relates the change in peanut prices with 













Examples of this adjustment mechanism can be found in two sources: in the economic 
literature that tries to explain how prices converge to the equilibrium (see, for instance 
Baumol, 1952, Arrow, 1959) and in the literature of market disequilibrium (see, for 
instance Grossman, 1974, Salanie, 1991).  
  We will solve the problem where the oligopsonists collude and behave as if they 
were a monopsony.
5 If the shellers realize that their current decisions are going to affect 
their future profits through inventories carried by the government, they are going to 
                                                 
5 While the assumption of an oligopsony seen as a monopsony is not trivial, since 
oligopsony models can produce rich dynamics in the form of processes of collusion and 
"wars" between firms with market power such as in Porter, 1983, we consider that 
assuming colluded oligopsonists does not modify the central idea of the paper and 
simplifies significantly the model.   8
choose their output in order to maximize their intertemporal profits. Therefore, the 
intertemporal shellers problem is given by the following expression, where  1 w is the 
price of the composite input, which is assumed to be exogenous for the industry.  
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  We will assume that shellers know the price adjustment mechanism, then we can 
write  W
t P using recursively (3) and (4) and assuming that  W
0 P  and  0 G are given and a 
terminal period T 
6, such as in (6): 








t Q H ˆ e 1 1 i t G t P P ) 6 (  
  The solution of problem (5) yields the sequence of a plan of processed good 
supplies,  { } T 1 Q ˆ ,..., Q ˆ  (and therefore the demand for peanuts{ } T 1 Q ˆ ,..., Q ˆ λ λ ). The first 
order conditions for (5) are given by (7) for  T ,..., 1 t = : 























1 i 1 i  is negative, the shellers will have 
incentives to decrease their current production and increase their future production, as the 
effect of the inventories carried by the government tends to depress future prices of 
                                                 
6 Although one may think to solve the problem ad-infinitum, in practice, given that the 
policy framework is modified normally each farm bill, probably makes more sense to 
consider a finite terminal period.   9
peanuts. If we drop the last term in (7), we would have a case where the oligopsonists 
only can exercise their power in the current period; that would be the case when all the 




L G P P − , where  *
t P is the world price at which peanuts (in-shell) can be sold). For 
completeness sake in this case (7) becomes (8):  














One should observe that USDA can set the repayment rate  R
t P  above the price 
the oligopsonists would be interested to pay  W
t P , in order to reduce the cost of the 
marketing loan program. However, since  R
t P is greater than  W
t P , this may reduce 
shellers' purchases of peanuts and thus increase USDA carryover. In addition, it may 
generate an explosive situation where stocks in the hands of USDA keep growing since 
there is no interaction between the farmer stock peanut market and the shelled peanut 
market, since the oligopsonists buy the peanuts at the exogenous repayment rate, and the 
peanut production is governed by the loan rate. When the government sets  R
t P , condition 
(7) become (9): 














Condition (9) corresponds also to the competitive case when  R
t P corresponds to 
the market price, exogenous to the shellers. It is also possible to extend the previous 
analysis about the intertemporal oligopsonists to the case when shellers know that USDA   10
cannot carry more than a certain level of inventory, say G , after which USDA will have 
to resale its inventories (i.e., go back to a market determined situation). In this case, if for 
instance USDA sets the repayment rate in time period 1, the oligopsonists may find it 
convenient to purchase as little as possible in order to regain control over the peanut 
price.
7 In this case, we should have  G G1 = and ( ) 0 Q G G H ˆ e 1
1
0 1 1 ≥ = λ
− + + , in which case, 
the intertemporal profit function becomes (10): 
[] () {} () {} ∑ λ ⋅ − φ ⋅ − ⋅ β + λ ⋅ − φ ⋅ − ⋅ = π
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In this case  W
t P is given by (11): 








t Q H ˆ e 1 1 i t G 1 t P P ) 11 (  
The first order conditions of (9) are the same with those given by (7) but for 
periods T ,..., 2 t = . It is clear that the shellers will follow strategy (10) if and only if it 
maximizes their intertemporal profits.   
In the previous discussion we have assumed the repayment rate to  be an 
exogenous price, which is partially true since it is set by USDA; however, the 2002 Farm 
Act defines it as "a USDA-determined repayment rate designed to minimize loan 
forfeiture, government-owned stocks, and storage costs" (USDA-ERS, 2003), which 
"provides" the criteria of how the repayment rate should be set. It should be noted that 
minimization of loan forfeitures and government own stocks are basically the same 
                                                 
7 Certainly, the goal of making USDA to carry G stocks can be reached not necessarily in 
the first period but certainly since intertemporal profits are discounted, shellers would 
like to reach the goal in the least number of periods.   11
objective since once forfeited the loan, the collateral becomes government-owned stocks. 
Also, the minimization of the objective is somewhat trivial because it is minimized by 
selling at the price that the market wants to pay, since at that price USDA would not carry 
stocks. Certainly, if the shellers have market power, such an objective is worrisome since 
it would tend to increase the cost of the program. Instead of the previous objective, let us 
consider that USDA wants to minimize the cost of the marketing loan program. This is 
given by (13): 
() () () ()
[] () t 1 t
1 t t L
L

































 Where  1 t G − is USDA initial stock at period t (accumulated through forfeitures) 
and 0 R t ≥  is the collateral from forfeited loans that becomes part of USDA stocks. Cost 
(13) in period t can be broken into three components: the first term, i.e., 
( ) () () t t t
R
t
L R H ˆ e 1 P P − ⋅ + ⋅ −  represents the direct program cost and it decreases as 
R











t 1 t , represents the storage 
and financial costs of carrying the inventories, which increases with  R
t P ( ku is the 
marginal storage cost for unshelled peanuts, assumed constant, and r is the interest rate). 
The third term, i.e.,  [] () t 1 t
1 t t L R G
r 1
P E








+ , represents the (expected) change in 
the value of the inventories, assuming that they are sold during the next period. Since 
there are no speculative inventories, the effect of increases in  R
t P will increase  t Ra n d    12
W
t P , and depress  [] 1 t t P E + , reducing the expected value of the inventories carried by 
USDA. Summarizing, increases in  R
t P reduce the first term in the cost expression, but 
would increase the last two
8. In addition, it is important to note, as shown in the annex, 
that increasing  R
t P  does not necessarily decrease the cost (13). 
To close the model, we need to specify a utilization (i.e., consumption) demand 
for shelled peanuts (i.e.,  S
t C , which is the sum of shelled peanuts destined to food 
products, exports, and crushing, i.e., peanut oil and meal). The demand in its inverse form 




t C P P ) 14 ( =  
  In addition, because we assume that the shelled market is competitive and, 
therefore inventories and prices of shelled peanuts follow the well-known "arbitrage 
conditions" (see Williams and Wright, 1991), such as (15), that express that no profits are 
made from carrying inventories (where ks  represents the marginal cost of storing shelled 
peanuts, assumed also constant).  
() [ ] 0 I P E
r 1
1
ks I I Q P ) 15 ( t
S








≥ + − + + −  
   Finally, if the peanut market is perfectly competitive, the arbitrage conditions also 
have to be satisfied by the peanut prices, such as in (16), where  t S  are the peanut stocks 
                                                 
8 In the case of perfect competition, under the presence of private inventories, the 
increase in the government inventories would be accompanied by a decrease in private 
inventories (i.e., crowding out effect) leaving  [ ] 1 t t P E +   unchanged until private 
inventories were exhausted, after which   [ ] 1 t t P E +  would start to decrease.   13
carried to the next period. In the competitive case under a marketing loan program, the 
repayment rate would be set equal to that price that clears the market.  
() [] {} [ ] 0 S P E
r 1
1
ku S A w P
1
) 16 ( t
W



















  Summarizing, we have 3 models. The first one is the oligopsonistic model with 
repayment rate set equal to the price set by the oligopsonists, model with at least three 
variations: intertemporal optimization, period by period optimization (i.e., myopic), and 
the situation when USDA has a maximum possible stock before reverting to the 
oligopsony set case. The second model describes the case when USDA sets the 
repayment rate and has no commitment about the maximum stock that it can carry. 
Finally, the third model is the perfect competition model. We will concentrate the 
analysis of the next section on the oligopsony with intertemporal optimization and the 
perfect competition case (for comparison purposes). 
 
III.  Illustrative Case: The US Peanut Market 
We illustrate the previous situation for the case of the peanut market. The 2002 
Farm Act modified significantly the US peanut program by eliminating the marketing 
quota system and introducing a marketing loan program available to all peanut producers. 
The marketing loan rate for peanuts is fixed at $355 per short ton. Producers can pledge 
their peanuts as collateral and repay the loan at a rate that is either lesser of $355 per 
short ton plus interest or a USDA-determined repayment rate designed to minimize loan 
forfeiture, government-owned stocks, and storage costs. Alternatively, the producer may 
forgo the marketing loan and opt for a loan deficiency payment at a payment rate equal to 
the difference between the loan rate and the loan repayment rate. Figure 1 presents the   14
loan rate and the repayment rate for each peanut variety since the beginning of the 
program.   
Source: USDA-FSA, 2002
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With respect to the existence of market power in the demand for peanuts, first it is 
important to acknowledge that there is little information about the peanut industry. This 
fact may render it difficult to determine the presence of market power. However, the 
existing evidence points out that the industry has followed a concentration process. 
According to Kamerschen (1998), in 1992 Golden Peanuts Company bought Dothan Oil 
representing together 38.3 percent of the total peanut purchases in Georgia (the main state 
producer of peanuts). In addition, Stevens/Cargill and Mc Cleskey Mill merged, reaching 
together 25 percent of the purchases in Georgia. In 2000, Cargill Peanut Products joined 
Golden Peanuts as a partner. Considering the 1992 shares, the companies would represent 
together 63.3 percent of the total purchases in Georgia. Similar evidence can be found in 
Epperson et al. (1988). According to them, the top four shellers purchase about 80   15
percent of the peanuts in all major production areas, with the exception of Georgia where 
the percentage is about 60 percent. 
The statistical information after the elimination of the marketing quota for peanuts 
may give more evidence about the existence of market power in the purchase of peanuts. 
On the supply side, the production of peanuts went down during the 2002/2003 crop year 
by 22.4 percent with respect to the previous crop year (with a decrease in the harvested 
acreage by 8.2 percent and in yields by 15.5 percent). On the demand side, despite the 
significant decrease in the price paid for peanuts destined to the food industry, the 
consumption of peanuts for milling decreased by 3.1 percent. Under the marketing quota, 
peanuts destined to the food industry were paid US$ 610 per short ton. After the 
elimination of the quota, the repayment rate of peanuts has fluctuated around US$ 320 
per short ton, which is almost half the previous price for peanuts. Furthermore, in contrast 
with the behavior of the repayment rate, the price of US peanuts abroad (using the 40/50 
size CIF prices in Rotterdam for US peanuts) have increased steadily since August 2002 
as shown in figure 2. Therefore we may interpret the behavior of the sheller sector as an 
attempt to keep repayment prices low.   16
Source: The Public Ledger
















































































It is also worthy to consider how USDA peanut stocks under the marketing loan 
program have evolved since October 2002 (month when the marketing loan program 
started effectively to operate). Westcott and Price (1999) point out that, during the mid-
1980s, market soybean prices fell below the loan rates, and the marketing loan program 
supported the prices. In 1985, loan placements reached 25 percent of the production and 
60 percent of those placements were forfeited (i.e., 15 percent of the production). As of 
January 31, 2003 (last day to place peanuts under the marketing loan program), 39.4 
percent of the production were placed under the loan, although as of April 30, 18.4 
percent of these peanuts still remains under loan. 
Simulations 
The first step towards the simulation part of the paper was to estimate or calibrate 
the relationships to be used in the model. Table 1 presents the relationships used in the 
simulation. These are: the aggregate consumption demand for shelled peanuts by   17
manufacturers, crushers (i.e., oil and meal), and exporters, a planned supply/harvest 
function for peanuts and the production function of shelled peanuts.  
It is important to note that the estimation of economic relationships for the peanut 
market presents problems not only due to the fact that the 2002 Farm Act represents a 
structural change, but also because the effects that the previous legislation had on the 
sector. In fact, each Farm Act since 1977 has introduced modifications to the peanut 
sector in order to reduce its cost, although keeping the marketing quota for peanuts.   
While it is possible to estimate the demand for peanuts based on information of 
the previous program, this information does not allow estimating the planned supply 
function. The main difficulty relates to the heterogeneity of peanut producers (i.e., those 
producing for the marketing quota, and those producing peanuts above the quota, i.e., 
"additionals") and to the lack of information about what proportion of the production was 
sold to each marketing segment (i.e., quota and additionals). Without this information, it 
is not possible to know the effective price received by the producer. Therefore, we have 
used a simple calibration procedure to compute the planned supply (see Revoredo and 
Fletcher, 2002). The errors around the supply were calibrated in order to obtain a similar 
distribution (based on mean and variance) to that observed for the peanut harvest for the 
period 1996-2002. 










t a L a ,
M
min . In the absence of information for the shelled peanut industry (i.e., 
inputs, costs, etc.), we calibrate the production function using condition (9), i.e., the profit 
maximization for a given price. We set the value of the price of the aggregate inputs 
equal to 1 and the elasticity (i.e.,  2 a ) to 0.5 and computed the value of  1 a based on the 
average information for peanut prices, shelled peanut prices and production of shelled   18
peanuts for the period 1996 to 2002. The technical coefficient λ was set based on 
USDA's conversion factor from farmer stock peanut to shelled peanuts, i.e., 1.33.  
For the coefficient of price adjustment (i.e., γ) we used the information about the 
repayment rate set by USDA and the outstanding stock of peanuts under the marketing 
loan. Based on these data and using equation (4) we computed the average coefficient, 
which is presented in table 1. 
Table 1: Functions and parameters used in the baseline scenario 
Intercept Expected price
Planned supply of peanuts function (net weight) 1860.50 60.74
Inverse demand function from processors 1/ Intercept Quantity
   End. Var.: average shelled peanut price (1990-92 Cents/Lb.) 490.30 -0.21
Shelled peanut production function (Mill. Lb.) a1 a2 λ
158.10 0.50 1.33
Price adjustment coefficient (γ) 0.003
Minimum import access (Mill. Lb.) 151.60
Interest rate (6 months-percentage) 5/ 3.02
Storage cost (Cents/Lb.) 6/ 1.62
Loan rate (Cents/Lb.) 17.75
Price of other inputs 1.00
Harvest errors (multiplicative, all with the same probability) -0.248, -0.124, 0, 0.124, 0.248
1/ Based on the following regression estimated by TSLS for the period 1983-2002. 
   Endogenous variable: Demand for Shelled Peanuts (Mill. Lb) Coefficients t statistics Mean values
   Intercept 1,506.92 4.70
   Average price for shelled peanuts (1990-92 Cents/Lb.) -4.76 -1.66 58.54
   Demand lagged one period 0.40 2.35 1,959.48
   Dummy year 1991 446.38 3.58
   Dummy year 1996 -170.97 -1.31
   R
2 0.57
   Durbin h -1.47
2/ Baseline scenario considers situation under TRQ.
3/ Total imported peanuts (source: USDA-FAS).
4/ US 40/50 size Rotterdam price transformed to farmer stock peanut price in US (source: The Public Ledger).
5/ Six month treasury bill interest rate (six month rate) (source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis).
6/ Commercial storage cost for Georgia (source: Webb, 2003).
     19
  We built the dynamic stochastic simulation model.
9 To solve the model we 
assumed that expectations in the model where rational in the sense of Muth i.e., deduced 
from the model. To find the rational expectation equilibrium we solve the model 
backwards from a determined final period, for which final conditions were assumed. Due 
to the computational burden of the model, we considered the solution of a two years 
model. We present first the perfect competition results to use them as a baseline.  The 
oligopsony model proved especially sensitive to the initial price and to the rate of price 
adjustment; therefore, we simulated the oligopsony solution for the several values of 
these variables. Table 2 presents the results of the simulations. 
  As shown in table 2, the oligopsony model implies lower levels of production of 
shelled peanuts and also of peanuts (although these ones are protected by the marketing 
loan rate) in comparison with the perfect competition model and, therefore for most 
cases, a higher price for shelled peanut prices. 
  It should be noted that depending on the combination of price adjustment 
coefficient and initial peanut price, the oligopsony price for shelled peanuts may be lower 
than in the perfect competition price. However, the peanut price and the ratio of shelled 
peanut prices to peanut prices will be lower than in the competitive case.  
 
                                                 
9 The routine, written in Gauss 5.0, is available upon request from the authors.   20
Table 2: Comparison of results between the competitive and oligopsony models 1/ 
Farmer stock peanut market 2/ Shelled peanut market 3/
Production Price Inventory  5/ Production Price Inventory





        γ=0.003 3,756.1 13.5 1,666.9 1,585.9 30.1 ..
        γ=0.004 3,756.1 10.6 1,839.2 1,456.4 57.1 ..




        γ=0.003 3,756.1 18.2 1,720.6 1,545.5 38.5 ..
        γ=0.004 3,756.1 15.3 1,891.7 1,416.9 65.3 ..




        γ=0.003 3,989.0 21.6 2,014.7 1,499.5 48.0 ..
        γ=0.004 3,822.1 19.4 2,013.5 1,374.9 74.0 ..
        γ=0.005 3,756.1 16.6 2,095.4 1,263.7 97.3
1/ Quantities are in millions of pounds and prices in cents per pound.
2/ Initial inventories equal to 20 million pounds.
3/ Initial inventories 600 million pounds.
4/ Situation corresponds to the results for the first period.
5/ Inventories carried by the government.
   
   On the effect of the adjustment coefficient, the greater this is, the lower will be 
the peanut price, and the higher will be the shelled peanut price. This indicates that larger 
adjustment coefficients give shellers greater possibility for extracting surplus from USDA 
(or taxpayers), which is, at the end, the one who will absorb the loss. In addition, it 
should be noted that, since exports of peanuts are not forbidden, the minimum price that 
shellers can pay for US peanuts is given by the world price for in-shell peanuts. 
  As shown in table 2, the oligopsony model implies significant higher inventories 
than the competitive case. These inventories are the result of disequilibrium in the peanut 
market with oligopsonists producing significantly less than in the competitive market and   21
the production of peanuts almost exogenous depending on the marketing loan rate. With 
peanut prices decreasing due to the amount of inventories, shellers prefer to reduce their 
current production for producing the next period when the peanut price will be lower. 
This is why the decrease in peanut prices is also accompanied by a decrease in production 
and not by an increase, as one would expect. However, this strategy of sending 
production to the future is explosive since farmers are forfeiting, in the simulation, about 
40 to 50 percent of the crop. In addition, since production of shelled peanuts occurs in the 
period (i.e., it is not lagged), it is not profitable for shellers to carry stocks of shelled 
peanuts but rather leave the government carry peanuts and process them according to the 
needs in the shelled peanut market.  
  In terms of a marketing loan program, an oligopsonistic demand implies that 
USDA will have to carry a significant inventory, and the costs of the program will tend to 
increase over time. In this context, setting a repayment above the price the demand wants 
to pay may minimize the cost of the program (see the annex for the conditions), since it 
will break the intertemporal movement in the production of shelled peanuts and reduce 
the difference between the marketing loan rate and the repayment rate. However, the 
possibility for setting a repayment rate is lost as soon as the border protection, 
represented by the TRQ is eliminated. 
  
IV. Conclusions 
  The purpose of the paper has been to analyze the effect that market power on the 
demand for an agricultural commodity may have on a marketing loan program. With this 
purpose we built a model, having as a reference the US peanut industry where, according   22
to the available literature, the purchasers of farmer stock peanuts demand may have 
market power.  
  The main difficulty in modeling an oligopsony (or a monopsony, since we are 
assuming a collusive situation) is that the standard static models ignore the observed lags 
in production that make the supply inelastic at the current period and the presence of 
inventories. This poses a problem in terms of price determination. Since in the model the 
quantity demanded of peanuts is set by the oligopsonists, and the supply of peanuts is 
driven by the marketing loan program that sets a minimum revenue per unit of output 
given by the loan rate, the resulting model is a disequilibrium model, where prices adjust 
to excesses of supply.  
  We estimate and calibrate some relationships for the peanut market and simulate 
two market structures: perfect competition and  oligopsony.    Our results indicate that 
under oligopsony the production levels of shelled peanuts and also of peanuts (although 
these ones are protected by the marketing loan rate) will be lower than in perfect 
competition, and therefore shelled peanut prices are going to be higher (we assumed that 
the shelled market for peanuts is competitive).  
  The model is sensitive to the initial price and to the price adjustment coefficient. 
On the one hand, the greater the initial peanut price, the lower will be production of 
shelled peanuts.  On the other hand, the greater the adjustment coefficient, the lower will 
be the peanut price and the higher will be the shelled price. With peanut prices in future 
periods decreasing due to the high inventories, shellers prefer to reduce their current 
production and increase their production during the next period. This is why the decrease 
in peanut prices is also accompanied by a decrease in production.    23
  In terms of inventories, the oligopsony implies higher inventories that are carried 
by USDA and no speculative inventories of shelled peanuts, since production of shelled 
peanuts occur during the period and therefore it is cheaper to let USDA carry the stocks 
and then buy its inventories to produce the shelled peanuts. In this context, setting a 
repayment above the price the demand wants to pay may minimize the cost of the 
program, depending on some conditions, since it will break the intertemporal allocation 
of production of shelled peanuts. However, the possibility for setting a repayment rate is 
lost as soon as the border protection, represented by the TRQ is eliminated, since in that 
case, the world price and the domestic price will be equal (or differentiated only by 
shipping costs or by a quality margin) and attempts of setting a repayment rate higher 
than the world price will be offset by trade movements. 
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Annex. First and second order conditions for USDA to minimize the cost of the 
marketing assistance program 
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  The first order condition for a minimum is: 
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  Since from the first order conditions for the processed output we have: 
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